Disjunction and distality: The hard problem for purely probabilistic causal theories of mental content by Roche, William
Disjunction and Distality: The Hard Problem for Purely Probabilistic Causal Theories 
of Mental Content 
 
William Roche* and Elliott Sober† 
* Department of Philosophy, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX, USA, 
w.roche@tcu.edu 
† Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin at Madison, Madison, WI, USA, 
ersober@wisc.edu 
 
Abstract: The disjunction problem and the distality problem each presents a challenge that 
any theory of mental content must address. Here we consider their bearing on purely 
probabilistic causal (ppc) theories. In addition to considering these problems separately, we 
consider a third challenge – that a theory must solve both. We call this “the hard problem.” 
We consider 8 basic ppc theories along with 240 hybrids of them, and show that some can 
handle the disjunction problem and some can handle the distality problem, but none can 
handle the hard problem. This is our main result. We then discuss three possible responses to 
that result, and argue that though the first two fail, the third has some promise. 
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1 Introduction 
Causal theories of mental content come in many varieties, but they are all based on the same 
motivating idea − that the content of a given mental representation type is determined by 
what causes tokens of that type.1 If, say, the content of perceptual belief type b is the 
proposition that that’s a dog, then, the story goes, this is because tokens of b are caused by 
the presence of dogs. This is just part of the picture, however, since tokens of b are also 
caused by foxes-at-a-distance, by retinal states of various sorts, and by lots of other things. 
The general challenge is to say why b’s content is one proposition rather than another, and to 
 
1 The extant literature on causal theories of mental content is huge. See Adams and Aizawa 
(2017, sec. 4.4) for a helpful overview. 
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spell out an answer in the language of causality, perhaps employing relevant ideas from 
logic and probability theory along the way.2 
This challenge has many facets. Suppose, for simplicity, that tokens of b occur only 
when they are caused by dogs or by foxes-at-a-distance. If a given causal theory T implies 
that b’s content is the proposition that that’s a dog-or-fox-at-a-distance and isn’t the 
proposition that that’s a dog or the proposition that that’s a fox-at-a-distance, then T entails 
that beliefs of this type never misrepresent – they are never false. It may be acceptable that a 
theory should occasionally judge that some belief types have contents that are never false. 
However, any theory that goes further, and judges that misrepresentation is impossible, has 
gone too far. Misrepresentation is ubiquitous and theories of content, whether they are 
causal or not, must explain why beliefs have contents that are sometimes false. This is the 
point of the infamous “disjunction problem.”3 
The disjunction problem has a cousin, the so-called “distality problem.”4 Suppose now 
that tokens of b are caused by dogs, by retinal states of type s, and by nothing else, where 
dogs cause retinal states of type s, and the latter, in turn, cause tokens of b. If b’s content is 
the proposition that that’s a dog, and a given causal theory T says that b’s content is the 
proposition that a token of s is occurring (which concerns the more proximate cause), and 
isn’t the proposition that that’s a dog (which concerns the more distal cause), then T has 
made a mistake. Here again, there’s nothing wrong with a theory that entails that some 
beliefs are about retinal states, but a theory that says beliefs are never about events in the 
external world has gone too far. 
 
2 Here and throughout our focus in on causal theories of the contents of perceptual belief 
types. How exactly such theories should be incorporated into fully general theories of the 
contents of belief types is a difficult but separate issue (as is the issue of how they should be 
incorporated into theories of the contents of mental state types other than beliefs). See 
Adams and Aizawa (2017, sec. 4.4), Buras (2009), and Gerken (2014) for relevant 
discussion. 
3 The disjunction problem is widely associated with Fodor. This makes some sense, since 
Fodor makes heavy use of it in his 1984 paper “Semantics, Wisconsin style” and in many 
subsequent works (e.g., Fodor 1987, Ch. 4; 1990a, Ch. 3; 1990b). But there are works prior 
to Fodor (1984) in which the essence of the disjunction problem is discussed (though not 
under that name). See, e.g., Dretske (1983, p. 89). For further discussion and references, see 
Adams and Aizawa (2017). 
4 The distality problem goes back (at least) to Armstrong (1968, Ch. 11) and Dretske (1981, 
Ch. 6). See Adams and Aizawa (2017) for further discussion and references. 
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The disjunction problem and the distality problem both concern ways in which a theory 
of content can go wrong. To cleanly separate these two problems, it helps to think of the 
disjunction problem as a synchronic problem and the distality problem as diachronic, as 
shown in Figure 1. The arrows from Cd to X, from X to Cp, and from Cp to B are causal; they 
indicate that Cd (the distal cause in the chain) causes X, X causes Cp (the proximate cause in 
the chain), and Cp causes B, where B is the proposition that this or that organism has a token 
of b at a given time.5 The arrow from X to XÚY, in contrast, is logical; it indicates that X 
logically entails XÚY. The issue raised by the disjunction problem concerns whether b’s 
content is X and isn’t the “simultaneous” proposition XÚY. The issue in the distality problem 
concerns whether b’s content is X and isn’t the “earlier” proposition Cd or the “later” 
proposition Cp.6 
Our interest here is in purely probabilistic causal (ppc) theories. Suppose that tokens of b 
are caused by X1, by X2, …, and by Xn. Let T be a ppc theory. If T entails that b’s content is 
X1 and isn’t X2, …, or Xn, then this is solely because of B’s probabilistic (and causal) profile 
with respect to X1, X2, …, and Xn. Perhaps, for example, it’s because B indicates that X1 is 
true in that Pr(X1 | B) = 1, but does not do the same for any of X2, …, or Xn. More 
specifically, a ppc theory T takes as “input” a set (perhaps infinite) of candidate propositions 
for b’s content (where, since a ppc theory is a causal theory, these propositions are restricted 
to propositions about things that can cause tokens of b), a probability distribution defined 
 
5 Here, for ease of presentation, we’re being a bit sloppy. Cd, X, Cp, and B are propositions, 
not events, but causation is a relationship among events, not propositions. We trust that 
readers will not be thrown into confusion by this. 
6 We aren’t assuming that causes always precede their effects; it suffices that this is often the 
case with causal chains leading to belief states. 
 
Figure 1
X ∨Y
⇑
Cd → X → Cp → B
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over B and those propositions, and nothing else, and then “outputs” a verdict on b’s content 
− for instance, the verdict that b’s content is X and isn’t any other proposition.7 
Some causal theories, in contrast, are probabilistic but only “partially” so. They take as 
input not just a set of candidate propositions for b’s content and a probability distribution 
defined over B and those propositions, but also something else.8 
We will focus on ppc theories, but this isn’t because we’re convinced that an adequate 
theory of content should be purely probabilistic. We harbor no such conviction. Our 
motivation, rather, is that the prospects of ppc theories in the context of the disjunction 
problem and the distality problem have been underexplored in the literature, and that this 
gap is unfortunate since a more thorough examination might be significant.9 If it turns out 
that some ppc theories are able to cope with the disjunction problem and the distality 
problem, and if ppc theories are nonetheless problematic as a whole, then this isn’t because 
of the disjunction distality problems. If, instead, it turns out that no ppc theory can handle 
both problems, then this provides additional motivation for partially probabilistic theories 
and also for non-probabilistic theories (i.e., theories that don’t take probability distributions 
as relevant inputs). Furthermore, it might be that a more thorough examination of ppc 
theories will suggest novel theories in the partially probabilistic camp, and perhaps some 
such theories will compare favorably with extant partially probabilistic theories. 
 
7 We put “input” and “output” in scare quotes because we aren’t saying that theories of 
content are decision procedures in the sense of providing an algorithm. 
8 An anonymous reviewer asks whether partially probabilistic causal theories are logically 
stronger than their corresponding purely probabilistic causal theories. Take some ppc theory 
T and some partially probabilistic variant of it T*, and suppose that each theory has the form 
“For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if …” where the right-hand side of T* is 
logically stronger than the right-hand side of T. It doesn’t follow that T* is logically stronger 
than T. In fact, it might well be that T and T* are mutually exclusive. Compare: the right-
hand side of “S is a bachelor if and only if S is an unmarried adult male” is logically 
stronger than the right-hand side of “S is a bachelor if and only if S is an adult male”, but the 
first biconditional is inconsistent with and thus isn’t logically stronger than the second. 
9 We aren’t claiming here that there has been absolutely no discussion of ppc theories in the 
context of the disjunction problem and the distality problem. Artiga and Sebastián 
(forthcoming) examine the theories of Eliasmith (2005), Rupert (2009), and Usher (2001) in 
that context. We will discuss these theories in what follows. However, the present point is 
that the class of ppc theories in logical space goes well beyond these examples. This should 
be abundantly clear by the end of Section 3 below. 
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The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. In Section 2, we clarify how we 
mean for the disjunction and distality problems to be understood. We also introduce a third 
problem, which we call “the hard problem.” In Section 3, we describe four types of ppc 
theory, and present two theories of each type. We call the eight theories in question “T1,” 
“T2,” and so on. Some of these have been discussed in the extant literature, but others are 
new. We also note several − 240, to be exact – hybrids of two or more of T1-T8. In Section 
4, we describe which of our candidate theories can handle the disjunction problem, which 
can handle the distality problem, and which can handle the hard problem. It turns out that 
though some can handle the first, and some can handle the second, none can handle the 
third. This is our main result. In Section 5, we consider three potential responses to that 
result, and argue that the first two fail, but the third has some promise. In Section 6, we offer 
some concluding comments. 
 
2 The disjunction problem, the distality problem, and the hard problem 
2.1 The disjunction problem 
Our target theories of content are causal, from which it follows that some candidate 
propositions for b’s content are ruled out from the start. For example, B is ruled out as b’s 
content, on the grounds that b can’t be caused by B’s being true, and propositions about the 
future are ruled out as well, and for the same reason. 
Consistent with this, consider the following: 
(DISJ1) b’s content is X, XÚY, or Y. 
(DISJ2) 1 > Pr(XÚY) > Pr(X&Y) = 0. 
(DISJ3) Pr(B&X) > 0 and Pr(B&Y) > 0. 
We will say that a given ppc theory T can handle the disjunction problem if and only if there 
is a belief state b, there are propositions X, XÚY, and Y, and there is a probability distribution 
such that (i) (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold and (ii) given the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T 
outputs the result that b’s content is X and isn’t XÚY or Y.10 We propose that an adequate ppc 
 
10 Note that the right-hand side of this biconditional leaves it open that there is a belief state 
b, there are propositions X, XÚY, and Y, and there is a probability distribution such that (i) 
(DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold and (ii) given the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, it’s not the case 
that T outputs the result that b’s content is X and isn’t XÚY or Y. 
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theory of content should be able to handle the disjunction problem thus understood. A ppc 
theory that passes this test thus makes room for misrepresentation. 
 The probabilities deployed in (DISJ2) and (DISJ3), and in what follows, should not 
be understood as credences. That would put the cart before the horse, since we want to 
consider theories that characterize propositional contents in terms of probabilities; this 
means that the probabilities themselves should not involve degrees of belief. A broadly 
“objective” interpretation of probability is needed, but we won’t assume any particular 
objective interpretation here.11,12 
  Our way of understanding the disjunction problem differs from Fodor’s (1987) in that 
his, but not ours, requires that each of X and Y be causally sufficient but not necessary for 
b.13 We prefer ours because it doesn’t involve that requirement and thus is more general, at 
least in that respect. We leave it open, however, that an adequate theory of content should 
also be able to handle Fodor’s version of the disjunction problem. The important point here 
is just that an adequate theory of content should be able to handle ours.14 
Assumptions (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) are pretty modest; for example, they do not entail that 
B is probabilistically dependent on X or on Y. The two assumptions therefore fail to reflect a 
feature of our simple example. We said that tokens of b are caused by dogs and by foxes-at-
a-distance, and it is natural to assume that these causes raise the probability of b’s occurring. 
This modesty is all for the good, however, since we are especially interested in finding 
theories of content that fail to solve the disjunction problem. If there is no probability 
 
11 There are numerous interpretations of probability; see Hájek (2012) for helpful discussion. 
12 An anonymous reviewer objects that ppc theories (or “approaches”) don’t apply to cases 
where we lack sample frequencies, and that this is true in many cases of perceptual beliefs. 
The issue, though, isn’t whether we have the requisite sample data. The issue is whether the 
requisite probabilities exist. If they do, then even if we don’t have evidence about their 
values, ppc theories have application. 
13 Here is Fodor’s (1987, p. 102, emphasis original) formulation: “… a viable causal theory 
of content has to acknowledge two kinds of cases where there are disjoint causally sufficient 
conditions for the tokenings of a symbol: the case where the content of the symbol is 
disjunctive (‘A’ expresses the property of being (A v B)) and the case where the content of 
the symbol is not disjunctive and some of the tokenings are false (‘A’ expresses the property 
of being A, and B-caused ‘A’ tokenings misrepresent).” 
14 It should be clear, then, that we are giving a necessary condition, not a sufficient 
condition, for the adequacy of a theory of content. The same is true with respect to the 
distality problem and the hard problem as formulated below. 
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distribution that satisfies our austere requirements, there is no probability distribution that 
satisfies a logically stronger set of requirements. We grant, though, that exploring different 
formulations of the disjunction problem is a good project for the future, and we take one step 
in that direction in Section 5.3. These points about the disjunction problem also apply to our 
formulation of the distality problem, to which we now turn. 
 
2.2 The distality problem 
Let’s return to the causal chain depicted in Figure 1, from Cd to X to Cp to B, and consider: 
(DIST1) b’s content is X, Cp, or Cd. 
(DIST2) B’s probability is increased by each of Cp, X, and Cd, Cp’s probability is 
increased by each of X and Cd, and X’s probability is increased by Cd. 
(DIST3) Cp screens-off each of X and Cd from B, and X screens off Cd from each of B 
and Cp.15 
These last two propositions are based on the assumption that (a) B is caused by each of Cd, 
X, and Cp, (b) Cp is caused by each of Cd and X, (c) X is caused by Cd, (d) causes (at least 
typically) increase the probabilities of their effects, and (e) events often screen-off their 
causes from their effects.16 
We will say that a given ppc theory T can handle the distality problem if and only if 
there is a belief state b, there are propositions X, Cp, and Cd that are causally related in the 
way just described, and there is a probability distribution such that (i) (DIST2) and (DIST3) 
hold and (ii) given the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T outputs the result that b’s content is 
X and isn’t Cp or Cd.17 We propose that an adequate ppc theory of content should be able to 
handle the distality problem thus understood. 
 
15 Here we have in mind “no-impact” screening-off: For any P, Q, and R, Q screens off P 
from R precisely when Pr(R | Q & P) = Pr(R | Q) and Pr(R | ~Q & P) = Pr(R | ~Q). This kind 
of screening-off is logically stronger than “positive impact screening-off” and “negative 
impact screening-off” as formulated in Roche and Shogenji (2014). 
16 We aren’t assuming that causality is transitive. We’re assuming only that some effects are 
caused both by their causes and by the causes of their causes. 
17 The distality problem so understood resembles what Artiga and Sebastián (forthcoming, 
Sec. 3.2) call the “wrong distality attribution problem,” but the two are different. 
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We mean for the distality problem to be understood so that it resembles but is distinct 
from “the solipsism problem.” The latter says that an adequate theory of meaning must 
allow for the possibility that organisms have beliefs about things outside their own minds. 
The former goes further and says that an adequate theory of meaning must allow for the 
possibility that organisms have beliefs about things outside their own bodies; this happens, 
for example, when you have beliefs about dogs as opposed to your retinal states. Any theory 
that can handle the distality problem can handle the solipsism problem, but not vice versa.18 
 
2.3 The hard problem 
We will say that a given ppc theory T can handle the hard problem if and only if T can 
handle both the disjunction problem and the distality problem. The hard problem is harder to 
handle than the disjunction problem and the distality problem taken individually. Why we 
give the hard problem that moniker will be clear by the end of Section 4. 
 
3 A gaggle of ppc theories 
This section has seven subsections. In the first four, we set out ppc theories T1-T8. In the 
fifth, we provide a table of those eight theories, and note an important distinction. In the 
sixth, we relate T1-T8 to various probabilistic theories in the extant literature. In the seventh, 
we provide two schemas for constructing hybrids of two or more of T1-T8. The result is a 
total of 240 additional ppc theories. 
 
3.1 Maximum-Probability Theories 
Consider the following: 
T1: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Pr(X | B) = 1. 
T2: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Pr(B | X) = 1. 
We call these theories “Maximum-Probability Theories,” since each says that whether b’s 
content is X is a matter of whether a given probability has the maximum value of unity. The 
probability at issue in T1 is the probability of X given B. The probability at issue in T2 is the 
 
18 Here we assume, contrary to Descartes, that minds have spatial locations – they are inside 
the bodies of minded individuals. 
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probability of B given X. Since there can be cases where the one probability equals unity but 
the other one does not, T1 and T2 are logically distinct. 
It might seem that T1 and T2 are too demanding in requiring probabilities of 1, and that 
they should be relaxed so that the probabilities in question need to be high but don’t need to 
be maximally high. However, note that these relaxed versions of T1 and T2 would be open 
to the worry that there’s no non-arbitrary threshold for high probability. Why, for example, 
set the bar at 0.95 as opposed to 0.949?19 
Note too that T1 and T2 can be understood so that the probabilities in question are 
restricted to special circumstances. Dretske (1981), for example, defends a theory in the 
neighborhood of T1 on which Pr(X | B) is relativized to a certain “training” period. This 
allows there to be cases after the relevant training period where B is true but X is false. 
 
3.2 Increase-in-Probability Theories 
T1 and T2 contrast with the following theories: 
T3: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Pr(X | B) > Pr(X). 
T4: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Pr(B | X) > Pr(B). 
These are “Increase-in-Probability Theories.” Although neither T3 nor T4 is equivalent with 
either of T1 and T2, T3 and T4 are equivalent with each other, since increase in probability 
is symmetric. We therefore count them as a single theory, which we call “T3/T4.” 
We don’t know of any proponents of  T3/T4, although Artiga and Sebastian 
(forthcoming) discuss it. We mention this theory for completeness, but there’s a further 
reason: even if T3/T4 is implausible on its own, maybe that theory can be used to construct a 
hybrid theory on which b’s content is X if and only if the right side of T3/T4 holds and some 
additional condition does too. We explore this possibility in Section 3.7. 
T3/T4 resembles T1 and T2: its right-hand side, like T1’s right-hand side and T2’s right-
hand side, is non-contrastive. To see whether proposition X is the content of b, you don’t 
need to consider an alternative proposition Y. T1, T2, and T3/T4 are in that respect unlike 
the theories to which we now turn. 
 
 
19 Note too that what we say about T1 and T2 in relation to the hard problem carries over to 
T1 and T2 when relaxed so that the probabilities in question need to be high but don’t need 
to be maximally high. 
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3.3 Highest-Probability Theories 
Here are two more theories: 
T5: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Pr(X | B) > Pr(Y | B) for any Y distinct 
from X.20 
T6: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Pr(B | X) > Pr(B | Y) for any Y distinct 
from X. 
These are “Highest-Probability Theories.” The right-hand side of T5 says that the 
probability of X given B is greater than the probability of any other proposition given B. The 
right-hand side of T6 says that the probability of B given X is greater than the probability of 
B given any other proposition. There are cases where the right-hand side of the one holds but 
the right-hand side of the other does not, so T5 and T6, unlike T3 and T4, are logically 
distinct. 
 
3.4 Highest-Degree-of-Confirmation Theories 
T5 and T6 are contrastive analogues of the non-contrastive T1 and T2. The following, in 
turn, are contrastive analogues of T3 and T4: 
T7: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if DOC(X, B) > DOC(Y, B) for any Y 
distinct from X. 
T8: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if DOC(B, X) > DOC(B, Y) for any Y 
distinct from X. 
These are “Highest-Degree-of-Confirmation Theories,” where, for any propositions E and 
H, DOC(H, E) is the degree to which E confirms H, and where confirmation is a matter of 
increase in probability. The right-hand side of T7 says that the degree to which B confirms X 
is greater than the degree to which B confirms any other proposition. The right-hand side of 
T8 says that the degree to which X confirms B is greater than the degree to which any other 
proposition confirms B. 
How is degree of confirmation to be measured? Several prima facie plausible answers to 
this question have been discussed in the literature.21 One is that the degree to which E 
 
20 Here and throughout by “distinct” we mean “logically independent.” 
21 See, e.g., Crupi, Chater, and Tentori (2013), Crupi, Tentori, and Gonzalez (2007), Eells 
and Fitelson (2002), and Roche and Shogenji (2014). 
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confirms H is a matter of the difference between H’s probability given E (i.e., H’s posterior 
probability relative to E) and H’s prior probability: 
DOCDM(H, E) = Pr(H | E) – Pr(H) 
This is the “difference measure” of degree of confirmation. Another prima facie plausible 
answer is that the degree to which E confirms H is a matter of the ratio of H’s probability 
given E and H’s prior probability: 
DOCRM(H, E) = Pr(H | E) / Pr(H) 
This is the “ratio measure” of degree of confirmation. DOCDM and DOCRM both meet the 
following minimal adequacy condition on measures of degree of confirmation: 
(*) There is a number n such that DOC(H, E) > / = / < n if and only if Pr(H | E) > / = 
/ < Pr(H).22 
Here “n” is the neutral point between confirmation and disconfirmation. For DOCDM, the 
neutral point n is 0; for DOCRM, the neutral point is 1. 
DOCDM and DOCRM are not equivalent. DOCRM is symmetric in that DOCRM(H, E) = 
DOCRM(E, H) in all cases. This isn’t true of DOCDM, for DOCDM(H, E) ≠ DOCDM(E, H) in 
some cases. 
We take no stand here on whether one of DOCDM and DOCRM is preferable to the other. 
It turns out, however, that if T7 and T8 are understood in terms of DOCRM, then T6, T7, and 
T8 are all logically equivalent to each other. We show this in Appendix 1. So, since T6 is 
already on the table, and since no two of T6, T7, and T8 are logically equivalent when T7 
and T8 are understood in terms of DOCDM, we shall understand T7 and T8 in terms of 
DOCDM.23 This choice allows an additional ppc theory to be placed on the table. 
 
3.5 B-to-X theories versus X-to-B theories 
T1-T8 are listed in Table 1. Even though we count T3 and T4 as a single theory, we list 
them separately in the table so as to highlight an important distinction. T1, T3, T5, and T7 
are “B-to-X” theories in that the right-hand side of each involves a conditional probability 
 
22 This is a compressed way of saying that there is a degree n such that (i) DOC(H, E) > n if 
and only if Pr(H | E) > Pr(H), (ii) DOC(H, E) = n if and only if Pr(H | E) = Pr(H), and (iii) 
DOC(H, E) < n if and only if Pr(H | E) < Pr(H). 
23 In Section 5.3, we address variants of T7 and T8 on which neither DOCDM nor DOCRM is 
assumed. 
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that “moves” from B as the conditioning proposition to X as the conditioned proposition. T2, 
T4, T6, and T8, in contrast, are “X-to-B” theories in that the right-hand side of each involves 
a conditional probability that “moves” from X as the conditioning proposition to B as the 
conditioned proposition. T3 and T4 are logically equivalent to each other, but this isn’t true 
in general when it comes to B-to-X theories and their X-to-B counterparts.24 
Table 1: A partial taxonomy of ppc theories 
Theory Types Theories 
Maximum-Probability 
Theories 
T1: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
Pr(X | B) = 1. 
T2: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
Pr(B | X) = 1. 
Increase-in-Probability 
Theories 
T3: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
Pr(X | B) > Pr(X). 
T4: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
Pr(B | X) > Pr(B). 
Highest-Probability Theories 
T5: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
Pr(X | B) > Pr(Y | B) for any Y 
distinct from X. 
T6: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
Pr(B | X) > Pr(B | Y) for any Y 
distinct from X. 
Highest-Degree-of-
Confirmation Theories 
T7: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
DOC(X, B) > DOC(Y, B) for 
any Y distinct from X. 
T8: For any b and X, b’s 
content is X if and only if 
DOC(B, X) > DOC(B, Y) for 
any Y distinct from X. 
 
3.6 Extant probabilistic theories 
T1-T8 are all inspired by extant probabilistic theories (whether or not they are pure). First, 
T1, T2, and T3/T4 are inspired by Dretske’s (1981, 1983) theory. This is a theory on which 
b’s content is x only if Pr(X | B) = 1 > Pr(X).25 T1 and T2 are like Dretske’s in requiring a 
 
24 Our distinction between B-to-X theories and X-to-B theories resembles Field’s (1990, p. 
106) distinction between “head-world reliability” and “world-head reliability.” It also 
corresponds to Nozick’s (1981) distinction between “truth-indicating” and “truth-tracking.”   
25 Dretske’s theory (1981, 1983) additionally requires, roughly, that X be logically stronger 
than Y for any Y distinct from X such that Pr(Y | B) = 1 > Pr(Y). See Dretske (1981, Ch. 7) on 
carrying information in “completely digitalized form” for the official requirement. 
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maximal probability of unity, whereas T3/T4 is like Dretske’s in requiring a probability 
increase. Second, T5 and T6 are inspired by Rupert’s (1999) theory, on which Pr(B | X) 
needs to be greater than Pr(B | Y) for any Y distinct from X, but doesn’t need to have the 
maximal value of unity. Rupert restricts his theory to natural kind concepts, and so, strictly 
speaking, it isn’t identical to T6 (which isn’t thus restricted). Even so, T6 is obviously 
similar to Rupert’s, and so is T5 in requiring a highest probability as opposed to a maximum 
probability. Third, T7 and T8 are inspired by Eliasmith’s (2005) and Usher’s (2001) 
theories. These are theories on which DOCRM(B, X) needs to be greater than DOCRM(B, Y) 
for any Y distinct from X, but doesn’t need to clear some absolute threshold.26 They frame 
their theories in terms of “information” as opposed to “confirmation,” yet T8 is nonetheless 
similar to their theories, and so is T7 in requiring a highest degree of confirmation as 
opposed to a degree of confirmation greater than some absolute threshold.  
 
3.7 Hybrid theories 
There are ppc theories additional to T1-T8. Consider, for example, the following: 
T1&T2: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if (i) Pr(X | B) = 1 and (ii) Pr(B | X) 
= 1. 
T1ÚT2: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if (i) Pr(X | B) = 1 or (ii) Pr(B | X) = 
1. 
Each of these theories is based on T1 and T2. The difference is that the right-hand side of 
T1&T2 is the conjunction of T1’s and T2’s right-hand sides, whereas the right-hand side of 
T1ÚT2 is their disjunction. 
This is the tip of the iceberg. T1&T2 is but one of 120 instances of the following 
conjunctive schema (where each theory in question is one of T1-T8): 
 
26 Consider the following logarithmic variant of DOCRM: 
DOCLRM(H, E) = log[Pr(H | E)/Pr(H)] 
Strictly speaking, Eliasmith (2005) and Usher (2001) frame their theories so that 
DOCLRM(B, X) needs to be greater than DOCLRM(B, Y) for any Y distinct from X. Since, 
however, DOCRM and DOCLRM are ordinally equivalent to each other, it follows that 
DOCRM(B, X) > DOCRM(B, Y) for any Y distinct from X precisely when DOCLRM(B, X) > 
DOCLRM(B, Y) for any Y distinct from X. 
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Ti&Tj&…&Tn: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Ti’s right-hand side 
holds, Tj’s right-hand side holds, …, and Tn’s right-hand side holds. 
Similarly, T1ÚT2 is but one of 120 instances of the following disjunctive schema (where 
each theory in question is one of T1-T8):  
TiÚTjÚ…ÚTn: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Ti’s right-hand side holds, 
Tj’s right-hand side holds, …, or Tn’s right-hand side holds. 
These schemas yield a total of 240 ppc theories in addition to T1-T8. That is a lot. 
We will mention additional ppc theories in Section 5, but we now have enough theories 
to get started. There are seven “basic” (non-hybrid) theories (T1, T2, T3/T4, T5, T6, T7, and 
T8) and 240 hybrids formed from these basics (T1&T2, T1&T3, etc.). 
 
4 How theories T1-T8 and their hybrids fare 
T1-T8 are a mixed bag when it comes to the disjunction problem. T1 and T5 fall prey to the 
the disjunction problem, whereas the remaining theories - T2, T3/T4, T6, T7, and T8 - do 
not. These results are established in Appendix 2. A mix of good news and bad also arises in 
connection with the distality problem, though here the pattern is different. T1, T2, T3/T4, 
T6, T7, and T8 all succumb to the distality problem, whereas T5 does not. These results are 
established in Appendix 3. When it comes to the hard problem, in contrast, T1-T8 are all in 
the same boat: each of them falls prey to the hard problem. This follows from the fact that 
each of them falls prey to the disjunction problem or the distality problem. 
These results are summarized in Table 2. A “Yes” in a cell indicates that the theory in 
question can handle the problem in question; a “No” in a cell means that the theory cannot. 
Table 2: Which problems can T1-T8 handle? 
 disjunction problem 
distality 
problem 
hard 
problem 
T1 No No No 
T2 Yes No No 
T3/T4 Yes No No 
T5 No Yes No 
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T6 Yes No No 
T7 Yes No No 
T8 Yes No No 
What about the two hundred forty hybrids of two or more of T1-T8 noted in Section 3.7? 
It turns out that none of them can handle the hard problem either. We show this in Appendix 
4. Some of them can handle the disjunction problem, and some can handle the distality 
problem, but none can handle both.  
We are not the first to note that various ppc theories have trouble with distality. For 
example, consider this passage from Artiga and Sebastián (forthcoming): 
Consider the Fusiform Face Area (FFA), which is usually thought to represent faces 
(Kanwisher et al. 1997; Desimone 1991). Suppose we discover that a certain neural 
network R in the FFA selectively fires with significant intensity when there is a face and 
also that, given that R is active, the entity that is more likely to be present is a face. One 
might think these observations suffice for establishing the fact that the brain state 
represents face according to SGIT. Unfortunately, it is unclear that SGIT can deliver this 
result. Consider, for instance, the set of neuronal structures in the thalamus that are 
active whenever there is a face in front of the subject. If R has the highest statistical 
dependence with faces, it will also normally have the highest statistical dependence with 
these neuronal states in early vision. Thus, SGIT would entail that this activity in FFA 
represents neuronal activation in another part of the brain. This is of course an extremely 
counterintuitive result. Indeed, even if there was some principled way of excluding other 
brain states from being represented, other inadequate contents such as face-looking thing 
could probably not be avoided. (Artiga and Sebastián forthcoming, p. 8, italics original) 
Here “SGIT” is short for “Scientifically Guided Informational Theories.” T6 is an example 
of such a theory, and so is T8 when understood in terms of DOCRM.27 In our terminology, 
and focusing on T6, Artiga and Sebastián’s worry is that T6 outputs the mistaken result that 
b’s content is the proposition Cp, which describes neuronal activation in the brain, and isn’t 
X, which describes a face. 
There’s an important difference, though, between Artiga and Sebastián’s discussion and 
ours. Consider the the following claims from the passage just quoted: 
 
27 Why are the theories in question called “informational”? See Artiga and Sebastián 
(forthcoming, p. 3, n. 4) for an explanation. In Section 5.2, we discuss two senses of “mutual 
information” in the literature, and how they relate to ppc theories and the hard problem.   
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If R has the highest statistical dependence with faces, it will also normally have the 
highest statistical dependence with these neuronal states in early vision. 
Indeed, even if there was some principled way of excluding other brain states from being 
represented, other inadequate contents such as face-looking thing could probably not be 
avoided. 
These claims are prima facie plausible, but Artiga and Sebastián provide no argument in 
support of them. The claims are simply asserted. In contrast, we prove in Appendix 3 that 
there are no probability distributions such that (i) (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold and (ii) given 
the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T6 outputs the result that b’s content is X and isn’t Cp or 
Cd.28 
One final note is in order. The fact that a given theory solves the disjunction problem or 
the distality problem doesn’t mean that there are realistic probability distributions—
probabilitiy distributions in line with the relevant frequencies in the actual world—of the 
sort in question. Consider T5, for example, and the fact that it can handle the distality 
problem. It could be that no realistic probability distribution is such that (i) (DIST2) and 
(DIST3) hold and (ii) given the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T5 outputs the result that b’s 
content is X and isn’t Cp or Cd. Our adequacy conditions are very weak, which is why failing 
to meet them is a death blow to a theory, whereas meeting them is a minor victory.29 
 
28 Artiga and Sebastián consider a theory that we have yet to address. They call it “INFO.” It 
can be put like this: 
INFO: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if (i) Pr(B | X) > Pr(B | Y) for any Y 
distinct from X and (ii) Pr(X | B) > Pr(X | B*) for any B* distinct from B. 
This is like T6 except that it also requires that the probability of X given B be greater than 
the probability of X given any other proposition B* to the effect that the organism in 
question has a token of belief type b* at the time in question. It turns out, though, that our 
proof that T6 falls prey to the distality problem carries over to INFO. The problem is that 
any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold is such that Pr(B | X) < 
Pr(B | Cp). 
29 An anonymous referee suggests, in effect, that if X causes different retinal states on 
different occasions, and each such retinal state always causes B, then X’s probability given B 
is greater than the probabilities of the various retinal-state descriptions (taken individually) 
given B, and that because of this, b’s content is X and isn’t some retinal-state description. 
This idea is captured by T5, but we have two comments. First, T5 falls prey to the 
disjunction problem. Second, even if X’s probability given B is higher than the probabilities 
of the various retinal-state descriptions given B, it might be that X’s probability given B is 
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5 Three potential responses to the hard problem  
It would be premature to give up hope at this point, and conclude that no ppc theory can 
handle the hard problem. There are potential responses to consider. 
 
5.1 Weaken T1-T8 
In Section 3.7, we noted 240 hybrid ppc theories that were formed by using two or more of 
T1-T8. Each of those hybrid theories is like T1-T8 in that it gives a necessary and sufficient 
condition for b’s meaning X, and each is like T1-T8 in that it falls prey to the hard problem. 
What about ppc theories that are like T1-T8 except that they give only a sufficient condition 
for b’s meaning X or give just a necessary condition for b’s meaning X? Let “TiS” be Ti (for 
any i = 1, 2, …, 8) when weakened so as to give only a sufficient condition for b’s meaning 
X, and let “TiN” be Ti (for any i = 1, 2, …, 8) when weakened so as to give only a necessary 
condition for b’s meaning X. Can any of theses weaker theories handle the hard problem?  
The situation is perfectly uniform when it comes to T1S-T8S: none of them can handle 
the disjunction problem or the distality problem; hence none of them can handle the hard 
problem. The reason why is straightforward. None of T1S-T8S gives a necessary condition 
for b’s meaning X, and thus none of them can rule out any candidate proposition as b’s 
content. For example, although there might be cases where T5S outputs the result b’s content 
is X, T5S is unable to output the result b’s content is not say, XÚY.30 
It might seem that the situation is similar with respect to T1N-T8N. For, it might seem 
that because none of T1N-T8N gives a sufficient condition for b’s meaning X, none of them 
can “rule in” any candidate proposition as b’s content. However, consider (DISJ1) and 
(DIST1). The former says that b’s content is X, XÚY, or Y, while the latter says that b’s 
content is X, Cp, or Cd. Take some case where (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold, and suppose that 
one of T5N, for example, rules out each of Cp and Cd as b’s content because Pr(X | B) is 
 
not greater than the probability of the disjunction of the various retinal-state descriptions. 
See Roche and Sober (forthcoming, third to last paragraph in Section 5) for further 
discussion. 
30 It might be objected that since b’s content can’t both be X and be XÚY (though its content 
might both entail X and entail XÚY), any case where T5S outputs the result b’s content is X is 
ipso facto a case where T5S outputs the result b’s content isn’t XÚY. The problem, though, is 
that T5S itself implies otherwise. For, any case where Pr(X | B) = 1 is also a case where 
Pr(XÚY | B) = 1. 
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greater than each of Pr(Cp | B) and Pr(Cd | B). Then given the assumption that (DIST1) holds, 
it follows by T5N that b’s content is X. 
Table 3: Which problems can T1N-T8N handle? 
 disjunction problem 
distality 
problem 
hard 
problem 
T1N No No No 
T2N Yes No No 
T3/T4N Yes No No 
T5N No Yes No 
T6N Yes No No 
T7N Yes No No 
T8N Yes No No 
The situation with respect to T1N-T8N is summarized in Table 3.  First, neither T1N nor 
T5N can handle the disjunction problem, but the other theories can. Second, T5N can handle 
the distality problem, but none of the other theories can. Third, none of the theories can 
handle the hard problem. These results are established in Appendix 5.   
It’s interesting that the pattern for the necessary-condition theories T1N-T8N (as 
summarized in Table 3) is identical to the pattern for the necessary-and-sufficient-condition 
theories T1-T8 (as shown in Table 2). We conjecture that the reason for this confluence is to 
be found in (DISJ1) and (DIST1). 
 
5.2 Move from confirmation to either correlation or mutual information 
It’s not uncommon for theorists to use the term “correlation” in such a way that a high 
degree of correlation is just a matter of a high conditional probability. Consider, for 
example, the following passage from Fodor: 
However, the crude treatment just sketched clearly won’t do: it is open to an objection 
that can be put like this: If there are wild tokenings of R, it follows that the nomic 
dependence of R upon S is imperfect; some R-tokens - the wild ones - are not caused by 
S tokens. Well, but clearly they are caused by something; i.e., by something that is, like 
S, sufficient but not necessary for bringing Rs about. Call this second sort of sufficient 
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condition the tokening of situations of type T. Here’s the problem: R represents the state 
of affairs with which its tokens are causally correlated. Some representations of type R 
are causally correlated with states of affairs of type S; some representations of type R are 
causally correlated with states of affairs of type T. So it looks as though what R 
represents is not either S or T, but rather the disjunction (S Ú T): The correlation of R 
with the disjunction is, after all, better than its correlation with either of the disjuncts 
and, ex hypothesi, correlation makes information and information makes representation. 
If, however, what Rs represent is not S but (S Ú T), then tokenings of R that are caused 
by T aren’t, after all, wild tokenings and our account of misrepresentation has gone 
West. (Fodor 1984, p. 240, emphasis original) 
Dretske (1983, pp. 83-84) also uses “correlation” to refer to a single conditional probability. 
Fodor’s claims in the above quote make sense, if “high degree of correlation” means 
high conditional probability. For, switching to our notation, if X and Y each entails XÚY but 
not vice versa (since X and Y are mutually exclusive), it follows that Pr(X | B) < Pr(XÚY | B) 
and Pr(Y | B) < Pr(XÚY | B), which means that B’s “degree of correlation” with XÚY is 
greater than both its degree of correlation with X and its degree of correlation with Y. 
This usage of “correlation,” however, is miles away from standard usage in statistics. 
Consider: 
 
This is the Pearson correlation coefficient applied to propositions rather than to quantitative 
variables.31 Pearson’s r(H, E) has a range of [1, -1], where r(H, E) > / = / < 0 if and only if 
Pr(H | E) > / = / < Pr(H). Suppose, for example, that Pr(H | E) = 0.990 < 0.999 = Pr(H). Then 
though Pr(H | E) is high and thus E’s degree of correlation as understood by Fodor is high, 
r(H, E) is negative and thus it isn’t high. 
But are there cases where X entails XÚY but not vice versa, and yet it’s not the case that 
r(X, B) < r(XÚY, B)? Yes, for there are cases where X entails XÚY but not vice versa, and yet 
Pr(X | B) > Pr(X) whereas Pr(XÚY | B) < Pr(XÚY).32 Any such case is a case where r(X, B) > 
0 > r(XÚY, B). 
 
31 See Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952, p. 314, proof of Theorem 2) for discussion of how to 
understand correlation in the context of propositions. 
32 We give an example in Appendix 2. 
r(H ,E)= Pr(H & E)−Pr(H )Pr(E)
Pr(H )Pr(~ H )Pr(E)Pr(~ E)
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There are clear respects in which correlation as standardly understood in statistics is 
similar to confirmation as standardly understood in Bayesian confirmation theory. But, at 
the same time, there are important differences. Unlike DOCDM, r is symmetric in that r(H, 
E) = r(E, H) in all cases. And unlike DOCRM, r is maximal at 1 precisely when H and E 
entail each other.33 
This suggests that the way to solve the hard problem may be to replace Highest-Degree-
of-Confirmation Theories such as T7 with a Highest-Degree-of-Correlation Theory like the 
following: 
T9: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if r(X, B) > r(Y, B) for any Y distinct 
from X.34 
However, we show in Appendix 6 that T9 falls prey to the distality problem.35 Hence T9 
cannot solve the hard problem. 
Perhaps if T9 were modified in terms of some degree-of-correlation measure other than 
r, the resulting theory would be able to handle the hard problem. We leave that question for 
the future, and turn now to “mutual information.” 
Some philosophers use the expression “mutual information” to refer to the logarithm, 
base 2, of DOCRM(H, E): 
 
We noted in Section 3.4 that T7 and T8 can be understood in terms of DOCRM, and that if 
they are so understood, then T6, T7, and T8 are all logically equivalent to each other. The 
same is true if T7 and T8 are understood in terms of mi. This is because DOCRM and mi are 
ordinally equivalent in that for any H1, H2, E1, and E2, DOCRM(H1, E1) > / = / < DOCRM(H2, 
E2) if and only if mi(H1, E1) > / = / < mi(H2, E2); see Section 3.6 for relevant background. 
Hence it won’t help to modify T7 and T8 in terms of mi. 
 
33 DOCRM(H, E) can be arbitrarily close to 1 (the neutral point for DOCRM) when H and E 
entail each other. For, when H and E entail each other, DOCRM(H, E) = 1/Pr(H), and this 
ratio approaches 1 as Pr(H) approaches 1. 
34 Since r is symmetric, it follows that T9 is logically equivalent to T8 when understood in 
terms of r. 
35 T9 can handle the disjunction problem, but we won’t explain why here. 
 
mi(H , E) = log Pr(H | E)
Pr(H )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
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However, there’s another usage of the expression “mutual information” in the literature. 
In information theory (Cover and Thomas 2006), the expression “mutual information” is 
standardly used to refer not to mi, but to a weighted average of mi: 
 
Note that whereas H and E are propositions, ΓH = {H1, H2, …, Hn} and ΓE = {E1, E2, …, Em} 
are partitions of propositions (i.e., sets of pairwise mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
propositions).36 Can T7 and T8 be modified by using MI, and if so, would this help in terms 
of handling the hard problem? 
It isn’t clear how best to modify T7 and T8 by using MI, but we have a suggestion. 
Consider: 
T10: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if there are partitions Γ1 = {B, ~B} and 
Γ2 = {X, Y1, …, Yn} such that (i) MI(Γ1, Γ2) > MI(Γ1, Γ3) for any Γ3 distinct from Γ2 and 
(ii) mi(X, B) > mi(Yi, B) for any Yi in Γ2.37 
Think of this as working in two steps. First, MI narrows down b’s content to the members of 
a particular partition. Call this “the content partition.” Second, mi induces a further 
narrowing, to a particular member of the content partition. For example, suppose that the 
candidate content partitions are Γ2 = {X, Y, Z} and Γ3 = {X*, Y*, Z*}, that MI(Γ1, Γ2) is 
greater than MI(Γ1, Γ3), and that mi(X, B) is greater than each of mi(Y, B) and mi(Z, B). 
Given that MI(Γ1, Γ2) is greater than MI(Γ1, Γ3), it follows that the content partition is Γ2, 
and so, as none of X*, Y*, and Z* is a member of that partition, b’s content isn’t X*, Y*, or 
Z*. Given that Γ2 is the content partition, and that mi(X, B) is greater than each of mi(Y, B) 
and mi(Z, B), it then follows that b’s content is X and isn’t Y or Z.  
What are the candidate content partitions in the disjunction problem and the distality 
problem? It might seem that one of the candidate content partitions in the disjunction 
problem should include X, XÚY, and Y, and that, similarly, one of the candidate content 
partitions in the distality problem should include X, Cp, and Cd. But note that X, XÚY, and Y 
aren’t pairwise mutually exclusive, and neither are X, Cp, and Cd, so no set with X, XÚY, and 
Y as members or with X, Cp, and Cd as members is a partition. We will assume, instead, that 
the candidate content partitions in the context of the disjunction problem are Γ2 = {X, Y, 
 
36 For discussion of how best to interpret MI, see Roche and Shogenji (2018). 
37 Since mi is symmetric, it follows that the second condition on the right-hand side of T10 
is logically equivalent to the condition that mi(B, X) > mi(B, Yi) for any Yi in Γ2. 
 
MI(ΓH ,ΓE ) = Pr(Hi & E j ) log
Pr(Hi | E j )
Pr(Hi )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
i, j∑
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~X&~Y} and Γ3 = {XÚY, ~X&~Y}, and that the candidate content partitions in the context of 
the distality problem are Γ2 = {X, ~X}, Γ3 = {Cp, ~Cp}, or Γ4 = {Cd, ~Cd}. 
We show in Appendix 7 that T10 falls prey to the distality problem and thus can’t handle 
the hard problem.38 Hence, just as it won’t help solve the hard problem to move from 
confirmation to correlation in the sense of r, it also won’t help to move from confirmation to 
mutual information in the sense of MI. 
 
5.3 Move to a degree-of-confirmation measure other than DOCDM 
T7 and T8, when understood in terms of DOCDM, fall prey to the distality problem, but what 
if they are modified in terms of some degree-of-confirmation measure other than DOCDM 
(and also other than DOCRM)? Does this allow them to handle the distality problem? If so, 
does this modifiction also enable them to handle the hard problem? 
Before answering this question, it’s important to note here that our proofs in Appendix 3 
regarding T7 and T8 go well beyond these theories when understood in terms of DOCDM. 
Our proof that T7 falls prey to the distality problem generalizes to T7 when understood in 
terms of any degree-of-confirmation measure such that: 
Weak Law of Likelihood: For any E, H1, and H2, if (i) Pr(E | H1) > Pr(E | H2) and (ii) 
Pr(E | ~H1) < Pr(E | ~H2), then DOC(H1, E) > DOC(H2, E).39 
Further, our proof that T8 falls prey to the distality problem generalizes to T8 when 
understood in terms of any degree-of-confirmation measure such that: 
Final Probability Incrementality: For any E1, E2, and H, if Pr(H | E1) > Pr(H | E2), then 
DOC(H, E1) > DOC(H, E2).40 
It won’t help, then, to simply understand T7 and T8 in terms of any old degree-of-
confirmation measure that is distinct from DOCDM. 
 
38 It can be shown that T10, like T9, can handle the disjunction problem, but we won’t 
bother with that here. 
39 For discussion of the Weak Law of Likelihood and related theses, see Roche and Shogenji 
(2014). 
40 Final Probability Incrementality is logically weaker than the principle that Crupi, Chater, 
and Tentori (2013) call by the same name. 
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However, there are degree-of-confirmation measures on which Weak Law of Likelihood 
or Final Probability Incrementality does not hold. Here is an example: 
DOCDM*(H, E) = Pr(H | E)Pr(H | E) – Pr(H)Pr(H)  
This is a variant of DOCDM on which Final Probability Incrementality holds but Weak Law 
of Likelihood does not. Now consider: 
T11: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if DOCDM*(X, B) > DOCDM*(Y, B) for 
any Y distinct from X. 
It turns out, surprisingly, that T11 can handle the hard problem. We show this in Appendix 
8. 
This does not mean that T11 has any real plausibility in the context of ppc theories. 
DOCDM* is a rather strange-looking measure (to say the least). Why square X’s posterior and 
prior probabilities? Why not instead take them to the third power, or the fourth? Further, 
there are variants of the disjunction problem and the distality problem to consider. Consider: 
(DISJ4) Pr(B | X) > Pr(B) and Pr(B | Y) > Pr(B). 
Let’s say that a given ppc theory T can handle the disjunction* problem if and only if there 
is a probability distribution D such that (i) (DISJ2), (DISJ3), and (DISJ4) hold and (ii) given 
the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T outputs the result that b’s content is X and isn’t XÚY or 
Y. If, as it seems, an adequate theory of content should be able to handle the disjunction* 
problem thus understood, then T11 is inadequate. For, as we show in Appendix 9, T11 falls 
prey to the disjunction* problem. 
However, the fact that at least one Highest-Degree-of-Confirmation Theory can handle 
the hard problem perhaps provides some hope for ppc theories. 
 
6 Conclusion  
The disjunction problem is a problem for some but not all of T1-T8 and their 240 hybrids, 
and likewise with respect to the distality problem. The hard problem, in contrast, is a 
problem for every single one of T1-T8 and their 240 hybrids (Sec. 4). This generalizes to 
various weakened versions of T1-T8 (Sec. 5.1), to T7 and T8 both when they are modified 
in terms of Pearson’s correlation measure r and when they are modified in terms of mutual 
information MI (Sec. 5.2), to T7 when modified in terms of any degree-of-confirmation 
measure that, like DOCDM, meets Weak Law of Likelihood (Sec. 5.3), and to T8 when 
modified in terms of any degree-of-confirmation measure that, like DOCDM, meets Final 
Probability Incrementality (Sec. 5.3). The hard problem is recalcitrant! However, it doesn’t 
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bring down every ppc theory in logical space. T11, for instance, can handle it. We don’t 
claim that T11 is the right theory of semantic content, in part because it succumbs to the 
strengthened version of the disjunction problem described in Section 5.3. Rather, our point 
is that ppc theories have resources that should be scrutinized further, in connection with the 
hard problem, and with respect to other conditions of adequacy as well.41 We note, in this 
regard, that although we have looked at a largish number of candidate ppc theories, we have 
used a small handful of formal tools to construct those theories; many of those tools are 
Bayesian. There are other formal frameworks that are worth exploring.42 
We close with an analogy. Adaptationism is a research program in evolutionary biology 
that aims to explain the current traits of organisms in terms of natural selection in ancestral 
populations. It would be absurd to dismiss this research program on the grounds that 
adaptationism has so far failed to solve this or that problem. We feel the same way about the 
development of ppc theories of semantic content. This is a research program, and noting 
defects in this or that ppc theory hardly suffices to show that the whole program is bankrupt. 
Philosophers should be just as tenacious as scientists! 
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Appendices 
Some of the claims in the appendices below can be readily verified by using elementary 
probability theory, but others are more difficult. Some are based on various results in the 
extant literature; here readers can refer to the cited works for details. Still others were 
verified or found on Mathematica with Fitelson’s PrSAT (on which see Fitelson 2008). This 
is true, for example, of (A2.3.1) in Appendix 2. 
 
41 We remind the reader that what we’ve been saying about “the disjunction problem” and 
“the distality problem” has, for most of this paper, really been about highly specific 
“versions” of each. As noted in Section 2, other versions are possible, and exploring them is 
worthwhile. 
42 Here we draw the reader’s attention to Roche and Sober (forthcoming), where the Akaike 
Information Criterion is used to investigate the epistemology of hypotheses that attribute 
false beliefs. 
 25 
Appendix 1: DOCRM and T6, T7, and T8 
Bayes’s theorem implies that: 
 
 
These equalities imply: 
 
Given this, it follows that if T7 and T8 are understood in terms of DOCRM, then the right 
sides of T6, T7, and T8 are all logically equivalent to each other. Hence, if T7 and T8 are 
understood in terms of DOCRM, then T6, T7, and T8 are all logically equivalent to each 
other. 
 
Appendix 2: How T1-T8 fare in terms of the disjunction problem 
We address T1 in Section 2.1, T5 in Section 2.2, and the remaining theories in Section 2.3. 
 
A2.1: T1 
Any probability distribution on which (DISJ3) holds is such that Pr(X | B) < 1. It follows that 
any such distribution is such that T1 outputs the result that b’s content isn’t X. Hence T1 
falls prey to the disjunction problem. 
 
A2.2: T5 
Any probability distribution on which (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold is such that Pr(X | B) < 
Pr(XÚY | B) and Pr(Y | B) < Pr(XÚY | B). It follows that any such distribution is such that 
given the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T5 outputs the result that b’s content is XÚY and 
isn’t X or Y. Hence T5 falls prey to the disjunction problem. 
 
(A1.1) Pr( X | B)
Pr( X )
= Pr(B | X )
Pr(B)
 
(A1.2) Pr(Y | B)
Pr(Y )
= Pr(B |Y )
Pr(B)
 
(A1.3) Pr( X | B)
Pr( X )
> Pr(Y | B)
Pr(Y )
 for any Y  distinct from X  iff
Pr(B | X )
Pr(B)
> Pr(B |Y )
Pr(B)
 for any Y  distinct from X  iff
Pr(B | X ) > Pr(B |Y ) for any Y  distinct from X .
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A2.3: T2, T3/T4, T6, T7, and T8 
Consider the following probability distribution: 
X Y B Pr 
T T T  
T T F  
T F T  
T F F  
F T T  
F T F  
F F T  
F F F  
It follows on this distribution that: 
(A2.3.1) 1 > Pr(XÚY) » 0.824 > Pr(X&Y) = 0 
(A2.3.2) Pr(B&X) » 0.175 > 0 and Pr(B&Y) » 0.097 > 0 
Hence both (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold. It also follows that: 
(A2.3.3) Pr(B | X) = 1 > Pr(B | XÚY) » 0.330 > 0.149 » Pr(B | Y) 
(A2.3.4) Pr(X | B) » 0.392 > 0.175 » Pr(X) 
(A2.3.5) Pr(XÚY | B) » 0.608 < 0.824 » Pr(XÚY) 
(A2.3.6) Pr(Y | B) » 0.216 < 0.649 » Pr(Y) 
Given (A2.3.3) and the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, each of T2 and T6 outputs the result 
that b’s content is X and isn’t XÚY or Y. Given (A2.3.4), (A2.3.5), (A2.3.6), and the 
assumption that (DISJ1) holds, each of T3/T4, T7, and T8 outputs the result that b’s content 
is X and isn’t XÚY or Y. Hence each of T2, T3/T4, T6, T7, and T8 can handle the disjunction 
problem.43 
 
43 There’s nothing special about the above probability distribution. There are lots of other 
probability distributions on which (A2.3.1)-(A2.3.6) all hold, and each of them would have 
sufficed for our purposes. This point carries over to the probability distribution given below 
in Section A3.4. 
	0	0	1057	0	 331	1629	1057	 3251243
 27 
Appendix 3: How T1-T8 fare in terms of the distality problem 
We address T1 in Section 3.1, T2, T6, and T8 in Section 3.2, T3/T4 in Section 3.3, T5 in 
Section 3.4, and T7 in Section 3.5. 
 
A3.1: T1 
Any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold is such that Pr(X | B) = 1 
only if Pr(Cp | B) = 1. Hence any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) 
hold is such that T1 outputs the result that b’s content is X only if it also outputs the result 
that b’s content is Cp. Hence T1 falls prey to the distality problem. 
 
A3.2: T2, T6, and T8 
Any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) holds is such that: 
(A3.2.1) Pr(Cp | X) > Pr(Cp) 
(A3.2.2) Pr(B | Cp) > Pr(B) 
(A3.2.3) Pr(B | Cp&X) = Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.2.4) Pr(B | ~Cp&X) = Pr(B | ~Cp) 
(A3.2.3) and (A3.2.4) imply (see Shogenji 2003): 
  
They further imply: 
(A3.2.6) Pr(Cp | X) < 1 
Given (A3.2.5) and (A3.2.6), and given (A3.2.1) and (A3.2.2), it follows that: 
(A3.2.7) Pr(B | X) – Pr(B) < Pr(B | Cp) – Pr(B) 
This inequality implies: 
(A3.2.8) Pr(B | X) < Pr(B | Cp) 
By similar reasoning, it can be shown that: 
(A3.2.9) Pr(B | Cd) – Pr(B) < Pr(B | Cp) – Pr(B) 
 
(A3.2.5) Pr(B | X )−Pr(B) =
Pr(Cp | X )−Pr(Cp )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ Pr(B | Cp )−Pr(B)
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
1−Pr(Cp )
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(A3.2.10) Pr(B | Cd) < Pr(B | Cp) 
Given (A3.2.8), T2 outputs the result that b’s content isn’t X. Given (A3.2.8), (A3.2.10), and 
the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T6 outputs the result that X’s content is Cp and isn’t X or 
Cd. Given (A3.2.7), (A3.2.9), and the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T8 outputs the result 
that X’s content is Cp and isn’t X or Cd. Hence each of T2, T6, and T8 falls prey to the 
distality problem. 
 
A3.3: T3/T4 
Any probability distribution on which (DIST2) holds is such that: 
(A3.3.1) Pr(B | Cp) > Pr(B) 
(A3.3.2) Pr(B | X) > Pr(B) 
(A3.3.3) Pr(B | Cd) > Pr(B) 
Given (A3.3.2), T3/T4 outputs the result that b’s content is X. But given (A3.3.1) and 
(A3.3.3), T3/T4 also outputs both the result that b’s content is Cp and the result that b’s 
content is Cd. Hence T3/T4 falls prey to the distality problem. 
 
A3.4: T5 
Consider the following probability distribution: 
Cd X Cp B Pr  Cd X Cp B Pr 
T T T T   F T T T  
T T T F   F T T F  
T T F T   F T F T  
T T F F   F T F F  
T F T T   F F T T  
T F T F   F F T F  
T F F T   F F F T  
T F F F   F F F F  
It follows on this distribution that: 
 
72
565  
51
2260
 
96
113113  
17
113113
 
1
113  
17
10848
 
96
1243  
17
1243
 0  0
 0  0
 
1
67  
19395421
313141920
 
96
737  
19395521
35880845
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(A3.4.1) Pr(B | Cp) » 0.993 > 0.237 » Pr(B) 
(A3.4.2) Pr(B | X) » 0.636 > 0.237 » Pr(B) 
(A3.4.3) Pr(B | Cd) » 0.421 > 0.237 » Pr(B) 
(A3.4.4) Pr(Cp | X) » 0.598 > 0.151 » Pr(Cp) 
(A3.4.5) Pr(Cp | Cd) » 0.357 > 0.151 » Pr(Cp) 
(A3.4.6) Pr(X | Cd) » 0.595 > 0.252 » Pr(X) 
(A3.4.7) Pr(B | Cp&X) = Pr(B | Cp) » 0.993 
(A3.4.8) Pr(B | ~Cp&X) = Pr(B | ~Cp) » 0.103 
(A3.4.9) Pr(B | Cp&Cd) = Pr(B | Cp) » 0.993 
(A3.4.10) Pr(B | ~Cp&Cd) = Pr(B | ~Cp) » 0.103 
(A3.4.11) Pr(B | X&Cd) = Pr(B | X) » 0.636 
(A3.4.12) Pr(B | ~X&Cd) = Pr(B | ~X) » 0.103 
(A3.4.13) Pr(Cp | X&Cd) = Pr(Cp | X) » 0.598 
(A3.4.14) Pr(Cp | ~X&Cd) = Pr(Cp | ~X) = 0 
Hence (DIST2) and (DIST3) both hold. It also follows that: 
(A3.4.15) Pr(X | B) » 0.676 > 0.637 » Pr(Cd | B) > 0.632 » Pr(Cp | B) 
Given the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T5 outputs the result that b’s content is X and isn’t 
Cp or Cd. Hence T5 can handle the distality problem. 
 
A3.5: T7 
Any probability distribution on which (DIST2) holds is such that: 
(A3.5.1) Pr(B | Cp) > Pr(B) 
(A3.5.2) Pr(Cp | X) > Pr(Cp) 
These inequalities imply: 
(A3.5.3) Pr(Cp | B) > Pr(Cp) 
(A3.5.4) Pr(X | Cp) > Pr(X) 
 30 
Any probability distribution on which (DIST3) holds is such that: 
(A3.5.5) Pr(B | Cp&X) = Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.5.6) Pr(B | ~Cp&X) = Pr(B | ~Cp) 
These equalities imply: 
(A3.5.7) Pr(X | Cp&B) = Pr(X | Cp) 
(A3.5.8) Pr(X | ~Cp&B) = Pr(X | ~Cp) 
(A3.5.3), (A3.5.4), (A3.5.7), and (A3.5.8) together imply (see Roche and Shogenji 2014): 
(A3.5.9) Pr(B | Cp) > Pr(B | X) 
(A3.5.10) Pr(B | ~Cp) < Pr(B | ~X) 
(A3.5.9) and (A3.5.10) together imply (see Roche and Shogenji 2014): 
(A3.5.11) Pr(Cp | B) – Pr(Cp) > Pr(X | B) – Pr(X) 
By similar reasoning, it can be shown that: 
(A3.5.12) Pr(Cp | B) – Pr(Cp) > Pr(Cd | B) – Pr(Cd) 
Given the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T7 outputs the result that b’s content is Cp and 
isn’t X or Cd. Hence T7 falls prey to the distality problem. 
 
Appendix 4: How hybrid theories fare in terms of the hard problem 
There are 120 instances of each of the following schemas (where each theory in question is 
one of T1-T8): 
Ti&Tj&…&Tn: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Ti’s right-hand side 
holds, Tj’s right-hand side holds, …, and Tn’s right-hand side holds. 
TiÚTjÚ…ÚTn: For any b and X, b’s content is X if and only if Ti’s right-hand side holds, 
Tj’s right-hand side holds, …, or Tn’s right-hand side holds. 
Each instance of the first schema is a “conjunctive” theory. Each instance of the second 
schema is a “disjunctive” theory. We address the former in Section A4.1, Section A4.2, and 
Section A4.3, and address the latter in Section A4.4, Section A4.5, Section A4.6, and 
Section A4.7. 
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A4.1: Conjunctive theories based on one or more of T2, T6, T7, and T8 
We show in Appendix 3 that any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) 
hold is such that: 
(A3.2.7) Pr(B | X) – Pr(B) < Pr(B | Cp) – Pr(B) 
(A3.2.8) Pr(B | X) < Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.2.9) Pr(B | Cd) – Pr(B) < Pr(B | Cp) – Pr(B) 
(A3.2.10) Pr(B | Cd) < Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.5.11) Pr(Cp | B) – Pr(Cp) > Pr(X | B) – Pr(X) 
(A3.5.12) Pr(Cp | B) – Pr(Cp) > Pr(Cd | B) – Pr(Cd) 
It follows that for any conjunctive theory T based on one or more of T2, T6, T7, and T8, 
there are no probability distributions such that (i) (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold and (ii) given 
the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T outputs the result that b’s content is X and isn’t Cp or 
Cd. Hence no conjunctive theory based on one or more of T2, T6, T7, and T8 can handle the 
distality problem. Hence no such theory can handle the hard problem. 
 
A4.2: Conjunctive theories based on T5 
We show in Appendix 2 that any probability distribution on which (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold 
is such that Pr(X | B) < Pr(XÚY | B) and Pr(Y | B) < Pr(XÚY | B). It follows that for any 
conjunctive theory T based on T5, there are no probability distributions such that (i) (DISJ2) 
and (DISJ3) hold and (ii) given the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T outputs the result that 
b’s content is X and isn’t XÚY or Y. Hence no conjunctive theory based on T5 can handle the 
disjunction problem. Hence no such theory can handle the hard problem. 
 
A4.3: T1&T3/T4 
There is only one conjunctive theory left to consider: T1&T3/T4. We note in Appendix 2 
that any probability distribution on which (DISJ3) holds is such that Pr(X | B) < 1. It follows 
that there are no probability distributions such that (i) (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold and (ii) 
T1&T3/T4 outputs the result that b’s content is X. Hence T1&T3/T4 falls prey to the 
disjunction problem. Hence it falls prey to the hard problem. 
 
A4.4: Disjunctive theories based on one or more of T6, T7, and T8 
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We show in Appendix 3 that any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) 
hold is such that: 
(A3.2.7) Pr(B | X) – Pr(B) < Pr(B | Cp) – Pr(B) 
(A3.2.8) Pr(B | X) < Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.2.9) Pr(B | Cd) – Pr(B) < Pr(B | Cp) – Pr(B) 
(A3.2.10) Pr(B | Cd) < Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.5.11) Pr(Cp | B) – Pr(Cp) > Pr(X | B) – Pr(X) 
(A3.5.12) Pr(Cp | B) – Pr(Cp) > Pr(Cd | B) – Pr(Cd) 
It follows that for any disjunctive theory T based on one or more of T6, T7, and T8, there 
are no probability distributions such that (i) (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold and (ii) given the 
assumption that (DIST1) holds, T outputs the result that b’s content isn’t Cp. Hence no 
disjunctive theory based on one or more of T6, T7, and T8 can handle the distality problem. 
Hence no such theory can handle the hard problem. 
 
A4.5: Disjunctive theories based on T5 
We show in Appendix 2 that any probability distribution on which (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold 
is such that Pr(X | B) < Pr(XÚY | B) and Pr(Y | B) < Pr(XÚY | B). It follows that for any 
disjunctive theory T based on T5, there are no probability distributions such that (i) (DISJ2) 
and (DISJ3) hold and (ii) T outputs the result that b’s content isn’t XÚY. Hence no 
disjunctive theory based on T5 can handle the disjunction problem. Hence no such theory 
can handle the hard problem. 
 
A4.6: Disjunctive theories based on T3/T4 
Any probability distribution on which (DIST2) holds is such that Pr(B | Cp) > Pr(B). It 
follows that for any disjunctive theory T based on T3/T4, there are no probability 
distributions such that (i) (DIST2) and (DISJ3) hold and (ii) T outputs the result that b’s 
content isn’t Cp. Hence no such theory can handle the Ditality Problem. Hence disjunctive 
theory based on T3/T4 can handle the hard problem. 
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A4.7: T1ÚT2 
There is only one disjunctive theory left to consider: T1ÚT2. We note in Appendix 2 that 
any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold is such that: 
Pr(X | B) = 1 only if Pr(Cp | B) = 1 
Pr(B | X) < Pr(B | Cp) 
It follows that there are no probability distributions such that (i) (DIST2) and (DISJ3) hold 
and (ii) T1ÚT2 outputs the result that b’s content is X and isn’t Cp. Hence T1ÚT2 falls prey 
to the distality problem. Hence it falls prey to the hard problem. 
 
Appendix 5: How T1N-T8N fare in terms of the hard problem 
This appendix has six sections. In Section A5.1, we show that T1N falls prey to the 
disjunction problem. In Section A5.2, we show that each of T2N, T3/T4N, T6N, T7N, and T8N 
can handle the disjunction problem. In Section A5.3, we show that T5N falls prey to the 
disjunction problem. In Section A5.4, we show that T1N falls prey to the distality problem. 
In Section A5.5, we show that T2N, T3/T4N, T6N, T7N, and T8N fall prey to the distality 
problem. In Section A5.6, we show that T5N can handle the disjunction problem. 
 
A5.1: T1N and the disjunction problem 
We note in Section A2.1 that any probability distribution on which (DISJ3) holds is such 
that Pr(X | B) < 1. It follows that any such distribution is such that T1N outputs the result that 
b’s content isn’t X. Hence T1N falls prey to the disjunction problem. 
 
A5.2: T2N, T3/T4N, T6N, T7N, and T8N and the disjunction problem 
We show in Section A2.3 that there are probability distributions on which (DISJ2) and 
(DISJ3) hold and: 
(A2.3.3) Pr(B | X) = 1 > Pr(B | XÚY) » 0.330 > 0.149 » Pr(B | Y) 
(A2.3.4) Pr(X | B) » 0.392 > 0.175 » Pr(X) 
(A2.3.5) Pr(XÚY | B) » 0.608 < 0.824 » Pr(XÚY) 
(A2.3.6) Pr(Y | B) » 0.216 < 0.649 » Pr(Y) 
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Given (A2.3.3), and given the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T2N, T6N, and T8N all output 
the result that b’s content is X. Hence each of T2N, T6N, and T8N can handle the disjunction 
problem. Given (A2.3.4), (A2.3.5), and (A2.3.6), and given the assumption that (DISJ1) 
holds, T3/T4N and T7N both output the result that b’s content is X. Hence T3/T4N and T7N 
can handle the disjunction problem. 
 
A5.3: T5N and the disjunction problem 
We note in Section A2.2 that when (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold, it follows that Pr(X | B) < 
Pr(XÚY | B). Hence when (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold, T5N rules out X as b’s content. Hence 
T5N falls prey to the disjunction problem. 
 
A5.4: T1N and the distality problem 
We note in Section A3.1 that when (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold, it follows that Pr(X | B) = 1 
only if Pr(Cp | B) = 1. Hence when (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold, T1N rules out Cp as b’s 
content only if it also rules out X as b’s content. Hence T1N falls prey to the distality 
problem. 
 
A5.5: T2N, T3/T4N, T6N, T7N, and T8N and the distality problem 
We show in Section A3 that when (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold, it follows that: 
(A3.2.8) Pr(B | X) < Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.3.1) Pr(B | Cp) > Pr(B) 
(A3.5.11) Pr(Cp | B) – Pr(Cp) > Pr(X | B) – Pr(X) 
(A3.2.8) implies that Pr(B | X) isn’t equal to 1, that Pr(B | X) isn’t greater than Pr(B | Cp), and 
that Pr(B | X) – Pr(B) isn’t greater than Pr(B | Cp) – Pr(B). Hence when (DIST2) and (DIST3) 
hold, T2N, T6N, and T8N all rule out X as b’s content. Hence each of T2N, T6N, and T8N falls 
prey to the distality problem. Given that (A3.3.1) holds when (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold, it 
follows that when (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold, T3/T4N doesn’t rule out Cp as b’s content. 
Hence T3/T4N falls prey to the distality problem. Given that (A3.5.11) holds when (DIST2) 
and (DIST3) hold, it follows that when (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold, T7N rules out X as b’s 
content. Hence T7N falls prey to the distality problem. 
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A5.6: T5N and the distality problem 
We show in Section A3.4 that there are probability distributions on which (DIST2) and 
(DIST3) hold and: 
(A3.4.15) Pr(X | B) » 0.676 > 0.637 » Pr(Cd | B) > 0.632 » Pr(Cp | B) 
Given (A3.4.15), T5N rules out each of Cp and Cd as b’s content. Given this, and given the 
assumption that (DIST1) holds, it follows by T5N that b’s content is X. Hence T5N can 
handle the distality problem. 
 
Appendix 6: How T9 fares in terms of the hard problem 
First, note that: 
  
We show in Appendix 3 that any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) 
hold is such that: 
(A3.5.9) Pr(B | Cp) > Pr(B | X) 
(A3.5.10) Pr(B | ~Cp) < Pr(B | ~X) 
These inequalities imply (see Roche and Shogenji 2014): 
 
 
(A6.1) r(Cp ,B)> r(X ,B) iff
Pr(Cp & B)−Pr(Cp )Pr(B)
Pr(Cp )Pr(~ Cp )Pr(B)Pr(~ B)
>
Pr(X & B)−Pr(X )Pr(B)
Pr(X )Pr(~ X )Pr(B)Pr(~ B)
 iff
Pr(Cp & B)−Pr(Cp )Pr(B)⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
2
Pr(Cp )Pr(~ Cp )Pr(B)Pr(~ B)
>
Pr(X & B)−Pr(X )Pr(B)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
Pr(X )Pr(~ X )Pr(B)Pr(~ B)
 iff
Pr(Cp | B)−Pr(Cp )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
2
Pr(Cp )Pr(~ Cp )
>
Pr(X | B)−Pr(X )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
Pr(X )Pr(~ X )
 iff
Pr(Cp | B)
Pr(Cp )
−1
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
Pr(Cp | B)−Pr(Cp )
1−Pr(Cp )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
>
Pr(X | B)
Pr(X )
−1
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
Pr(X | B)−Pr(X )
1−Pr(X )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
(A6.2)
Pr(Cp | B)
Pr(Cp )
−1> Pr(X | B)
Pr(X )
−1
(A6.3)
Pr(Cp | B)−Pr(Cp )
1−Pr(Cp )
>
Pr(X | B)−Pr(X )
1−Pr(X )
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It follows that any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold is such that: 
(A6.4) r(Cp, B) > r(X, B) 
By similar reasoning, it can be shown that any probability distribution on which (DIST2) 
and (DIST3) hold is such that: 
(A6.5) r(Cp, B) > r(Cd, B) 
It follows that any probability distribution on which (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold is such that 
given the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T9 outputs the result that b’s content is Cp and 
isn’t X or Cd. Hence T9 falls prey to the distality problem.44 Hence it falls prey to the hard 
problem. 
 
Appendix 7: How T10 fares with respect to the hard problem 
We noted in Appendix 3 that any probability distribution on which (DIST3) holds is such 
that: 
(A3.5.5) Pr(B | Cp&X) = Pr(B | Cp) 
(A3.5.6) Pr(B | ~Cp&X) = Pr(B | ~Cp) 
It follows from these inequalities that: 
(A7.1) Pr(~B | Cp&X) = Pr(~B | Cp) 
(A7.2) Pr(~B | ~Cp&X) = Pr(~B | ~Cp) 
(A7.3) Pr(B | Cp&~X) = Pr(B | Cp) 
(A7.4) Pr(B | ~Cp&~X) = Pr(B | ~Cp) 
(A7.5) Pr(~B | Cp&~X) = Pr(~B | Cp) 
(A7.6) Pr(~B | ~Cp&~X) = Pr(~B | ~Cp) 
 
44 What about the disjunction problem? The probability distribution given in A2.2 is such 
that (DISJ2) and (DISJ3) hold. It’s also such that r(X, B) » 0.512 > -0.510 » r(XÚY, B) and 
r(X, B) » 0.512 > -0.815 » r(Y, B). Given the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T9 outputs the 
result that b’s content is X and isn’t XÚY or Y. Hence T9 can handle the disjunction problem. 
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This means that each member of Γ3 = {Cp, ~Cp} screens-off each member of Γ2 = {X, ~X} 
from each member of Γ1 = {B, ~B}. Given this, it follows by the so-called “Data Processing 
Inequality” (Cover and Thomas 2006, Ch. 2) that: 
(A7.7) MI(Γ1, Γ2) ≤ MI(Γ1, Γ3) 
But then there are no probability distributions such that (i) (DIST2) and (DIST3) hold and 
(ii) given the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T10 outputs the result that b’s content is X and 
isn’t Cp or Cd. Hence T10 falls prey to the distality problem. Hence T10 falls prey to the 
hard problem. 
 
Appendix 8: How T11 fares with respect to the hard problem 
The probability distribution given in Section A2.2 is such that (DISJ2) holds, (DISJ3) holds, 
and: 
(A8.1) DOCDM*(X, B) » 0.123 > -0.309 » DOCDM*(XÚY, B) 
(A8.2) DOCDM*(X, B) » 0.123 > -0.374 » DOCDM*(Y, B) 
The probability distribution given in Section A3.4 is such that (DIST2) holds, (DIST3) 
holds, and: 
(A8.3) DOCDM*(X, B) » 0.393 > 0.377 » DOCDM*(Cp, B) 
(A8.4) DOCDM*(X, B) » 0.393 > 0.277 » DOCDM*(Cd, B) 
Given (A8.1), (A8.2), and the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T11 outputs the result that b’s 
content is X and isn’t XÚY or Y. Hence T11 can handle the disjunction problem. Given 
(A8.3), (A8.4), and the assumption that (DIST1) holds, T11 outputs the result that b’s 
content is X and isn’t Cp or Cd. Hence T11 can handle the distality problem. Hence T11 can 
handle the hard problem. 
 
Appendix 9: How T11 fares with respect to the disjunction* problem 
First, note that: 
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Any probability distribution on which (DISJ2), (DISJ3), and (DISJ4) hold is such that 
DOCDM*(X, B) > 0, DOCDM*(Y, B) > 0, and: 
 
It follows that any probability distribution on which (DISJ2), (DISJ3), and (DISJ4) hold is 
such that given the assumption that (DISJ1) holds, T11 outputs the result that b’s content is 
XÚY and isn’t X or Y. Hence T11 falls prey to the disjunction* problem. 
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